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I. Introduction
The dramatic boom and bust in the housing market has been a dominant factor driving household finances over the past decade. Housing wealth has proved to have a large influence not only on economic decisions faced by households, including mobility and consumption, but also on the overall health of the economy. However, some uncertainty remains about the precise magnitude of the boom and bust. Two approaches are typically used to measure changes in housing wealth:
relying on owner-reported house values and following movement in house price indexes (HPI).
When comparing these two sources, the owner reports show a much larger increase in values during the boom and a smaller decline in values during the bust (Figure 1 ). One possible explanation is that homeowners tend to overestimate the value of their house. . 4 If homeowners are in denial about their loss in housing wealth, we might expect the primary divergence between these two sources to come during the bust and not the boom, 2 particularly in the presence of loss aversion. 5 That said, the SCF is a triennial survey that did not conduct interviews in either 2005 and 2006 , so the SCF cannot pin down when the divergence between the SCF and CoreLogic occurred.
Two additional methods, more detailed than examining aggregate changes over time, can be used to compare changes in house values from the SCF with changes in the CoreLogic HPI.
The first compares the owner-reported, cumulative growth in house value, measured by the difference between the purchase price and current homeowner valuation, to the growth in local for owners who bought in the few years prior to the peak of the housing market.
These two methods are used to evaluate the role of two explanations that may help resolve the divergence between owner reports and transaction-based indexes. The first hypothesis is homeowners are not very good at valuing their home. Perhaps they are slow to process new information about prices or they are perpetually optimistic and believe their house is worth much more than the market value. The second hypothesis is properties that transact fluctuate in value differently than those that do not transact. This hypothesis implies there is heterogeneity in home value appreciation within geographic areas and therefore a correlation between house price change and the probability a household is in the sample in a future period. 6 The first potential explanation for the divergence between owner-reported and HPI-based changes reflects a concern of economists and policymakers about the reliability of homeowner valuations. Homes transact at infrequent intervals, and homeowners may not have the full information necessary to make an accurate valuation. Several studies evaluate the reliability by comparing the gap between owners' valuations and recent transaction prices. 7 Results from these 5 Genesove and Mayer (2001) . 6 Unfortunately, we know very little about the direct relationship between house price changes and mobility. Donovan and Schnure (2011) find lower overall mobility in areas with the largest declines in house prices during the housing bust. In contrast, Aaronson and Davis (2011) find no differences in interstate mobility in states with large declines in HPI. 7 These studies typically analyze recent buyers and sellers and compare the owner valuation closest to the transaction date with the actual transaction price. A HPI is used to bring the two values to the same period.
3 studies are mixed; they vary over time and location. 8 Anenberg, Nichols, and Relihan (2012) show that the gap between homeowner reports and recent purchase prices changes over time. It follows then that the relationship between owner-reported changes and changes in HPI varies over time as well.
9
The second potential explanation is that transacted properties fluctuate in value differently than those that do not transact. This key correlation between observed house sales and appreciation is fundamental to whether the sample of transactions represents the stock of houses and vice versa. If this correlation is nonzero, heterogeneity must then exist in home value appreciation within geographic areas that is not be captured by the HPI, a measure of central tendency. 10 There are implications of this hypothesis for both the transaction-based HPI and the interview-based SCF.
The HPI can only reflect properties that actually transact. If only quickly appreciating properties transact in a certain period, the HPI will show a large increase in value. This does not reflect the appreciation of the full stock of houses. Sample selection concerns are less of a problem for the HPI the longer the interval between current date (T) and period s of the index, where s<T. The more time that passes, the more houses transact. At some point, practically all homes transact and the HPI should reflect the population of houses rather than a subsample of early transactions.
The implication of the second hypothesis-that transacted properties fluctuate in value differently than those that do not transact-for the SCF is that a correlation will exist between house price appreciation and the probability a household is in the sample t years later.
For illustration, consider an SCF survey in year t. Assume in the years prior to t, there was no previous relationship between sales and house price appreciation. Then suppose that in year t+1 8 Goodman and Ittner (1992) , among others, use the American Housing Survey, whereas Benitez-Silva et al (2008) use the Health and Retirement Survey to look directly at the older population and find a similar gap between owner reports and transaction prices. Case and Shiller (2003) find survey evidence that suggests owners are backwards looking in forming their expectations about future house price growth. 9 Another implication of a changing gap between homeowner valuations and HPI is its impact on measurement error. If the gap varies over time, then the gap in changes in house values will also vary. If self-reported values are the "true value measured with error," but the magnitude of the error varies over time, then we have a time-varying attenuation bias whenever house values are used as a key independent variable. 10 See Korteweg and Sorensen (2011) for a lengthy discussion about the implications of a distribution of prices within a geographic unit.
4
only rapidly appreciating houses sell. Therefore, an SCF in year t+3 will contain slowappreciating houses purchased in year t and before and fast-appreciating homes purchased between t and t+3. This SCF t+3 sample is representative of homes owned in t+3 but not necessarily representative of sales in any year before t+1. As such, using a random sample of current homeowners to measure the change in house value for homes purchased in a previous period will be difficult if the subsequent transactions are not a random sample of the original purchases.
Using the two direct methods outlined above, the analysis here sheds light on house price appreciation and depreciation as measured by the homeowner and a HPI. I examine whether differences exist between owner-perceived gains and losses and HPIs and whether differences vary within the population. A wedge between owner reports and the HPI may occur due to sampling and methodology or for groups within the population that might be prone to overestimating the value of their home. I also examine the implications for measured loan-tovalue ratios (LTV) and levels of negative equity given in the reports of owners and predictions from the HPIs, since underwater homeowners are a population of interest to economists and policymakers.
Overall, owner-reported changes in house values are quite similar to changes in local
HPIs. The primary difference in these measures comes for those who purchased homes just before the peak of the housing market boom, "boom buyers," who report smaller declines in value than the HPI. Transactions that occurred during this period may fundamentally differ from other periods, making the divergence between the two sources perhaps unsurprising. Despite substantial differences in their estimation samples and the concepts measured in each source, the change in housing wealth described by each source is quite similar in the aftermath of the burst of the housing bubble. This conclusion is reached by making a careful comparison of ownerreported changes and house price indexes. The diverging conclusions from the cross-sectional data analysis and the panel data analysis during the housing bust suggest sample selection likely plays a role in causing the discrepancy between owner reports and HPIs during this period. If the first hypothesis-homeowners' errors in valuing their homes-is not very operative during the housing bust, then there must be sample differences contributing to differences in the growth of house values during this period.
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II. Owner-Reported Change in House Value since Purchase
This section compares the owner-reported change in house value from the SCF, defined as the house value from the interview relative to the purchase price, with the change in the CoreLogic HPI between the date of purchase and the survey date. 
If ∆ are orthogonal, the estimation of will be unbiased. This is the premise of repeat-sales HPI estimation. 17 The following discussion comes from Shiller (1991) . Transaction prices from an initial period are used as the outcome variable. The matrix of regressors contains sales prices for each pair of transactions with the set of X ij containing any price of house i being transacted in period j. The first transaction price is regressed as a negative value, and the second transaction price is regressed as a positive value. The estimated coefficients are 1 , where is the j th period index, where the index in period j is the ratio of the average price of houses sold in j divided by the average price in the base period. Obviously not all homes sell in the base period, so other properties are used to deflate the initial price to the base period through the other indexes calculated in the model. The resulting index is dollar weighted. CoreLogic also removes properties selling for less than $10,000 and more than $10 million. 18 They also do not have full geographic coverage, as they rely on public records and not all geographic units make real estate transactions part of the public domain. 19 The other primary difference between the FHFA and CoreLogic HPIs is the former includes refinances while the latter does not.
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The local HPIs matched to the SCF are defined at a core-based metropolitan area (CBSA). 20 The CBSA designation contains both metropolitan and micropolitan areas, making (2011) and Anenberg (2010) suggest that failing to account for LTV and nominal loss aversion in repeat sales indexes overstates the price nonconstrained owners can expect to receive. (2012) and Benitez-Silva et al (2008) . 23 See, for example, Gatzlaff and Haurin (1997) , Hwang and Quigley (2004) , Korteweg and Sorensen (2011), and Case, Pollakowski, and Wachter (1997) . 24 They also find the level of LTV ratios in the population plays an important role in determining the level of the HPI.
8 on average, report almost 90% increase in value from their purchase price by the survey date whereas the local HPIs only increased 60% on average. The varied relationship between the SCF and CoreLogic seen in Figure 2 suggests that if you want to compare owner-reported changes from household surveys with HPIs, additional sample adjustments are necessary to ensure that the relationship between the two samples is constant over time.
In the 2007 and 2010 SCF surveys, owners who purchased houses in the ten years prior to the survey show more appreciation or less depreciation than the CBSA HPIs suggest ( Figure 2 ). This implies that homeowners' errors can account for at least some of the divergence in measuring aggregate changes to the housing stock as seen in Figure 1 . 28 To estimate how much of the gap between the SCF and HPI can be allocated to the homeowners mis-estimation, I need to calculate an aggregate [dollar weighted] 'error' for the full sample. To do this I take each house purchased between 1990 and the SCF survey date, and multiplied the error-the gap between owner-reported change and change in the CBSA HPI-by the purchase value of the house. 29 This is an estimate of how many extra dollars each homeowner is responsible for adding to the aggregate housing stock measured by the SCF. I then aggregated the individual 'dollar errors' in each survey year, subtracted this total from the overall SCF aggregate stock, and recalculated the measure of appreciation between 2001 and the subsequent SCF survey (2004, 2007, and 2010) . The difference between this value and the measured SCF appreciation is the amount of appreciation that may be due to homeowner errors. 28 To do this, I ignore the other factors, such as heterogeneity in appreciation within CBSAs and sample selection bias from mobility, which can contribute to the gap between the homeowner report and the change in HPI. 29 As time increases between purchase date and survey date, the sample becomes much thinner and, therefore, is less likely to be a representative sample of homes bought in the purchase year. I return to the implications of this shortly.
III. Owner-Reported Changes in House Values during the Housing Bust
The lack of a consistent story emerging from the analysis of cross-sectional SCF leads us to the second approach, using the 2009 SCF panel to focus on changes in value for a fixed set of houses during the housing bust. In order to minimize sample differences and focus on homeowner errors, I used the SCF panel data covering 2007 and 2009. The panel re-interview allows us to control for sample selection issues, which plague the analysis of the cross-sectional data in the above section. Where sample attrition occurs due to moves or non-interview, I can better infer how the overall estimates are affected than can be done with the SCF cross-sectional data.
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Because of the unusual episode that occurred following the housing bust, I am unable to say much about external validity. However, if we think homeowners' errors-or the level of overvaluation-should be more prevalent as prices are falling instead of rising, the following analysis should put a bound on the error. Loss aversion suggests this should be the case. . 31 Approximately 90% of homeowners in the panel that did not move between interviews live in a CBSA. 32 Further analysis of this difference is left for future research. 33 A change in house value can be calculated for the movers, but it does not illuminate the current discussion. It can, however, provide evidence on mobility decisions following the housing bust.
12 than 20% of the sample. To look at the impact of the absence of these groups on the forthcoming analysis, Table 1 shows the distribution of these groups in the sample and the fraction of each who reside in a CBSA. An advantage of using the SCF is the detailed geographic information available, but the advantage can only be realized for those who reside in a CBSA. Table 1 suggests those who were not interviewed in 2009 Non-CBSA residents report a mean decline in value of 3.9%, suggesting that the primary analysis is not missing households with unusually large declines in value because of the sample restriction.
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The distribution of analogous changes in the CBSA HPIs is seen in Figure 5b . The mean and median changes are -11.3% and -12.7%, respectively, only slightly larger than the owner- (Table 1) . Those who no longer own their 2007 primary residence lived in areas less likely to see declines between 5% and 15% and more likely to experience declines in excess of 20% compared with those who have not sold their home. However, the average change in HPI for movers is not drastically different from the non-movers (Table 1) .
To incorporate the findings from Table 1 The error measure used in this analysis is the difference between the change in owner valuation and the change in transaction prices or HPI. The literature typically considers the difference between owner valuations and transaction prices, so the analysis here is evaluating the first difference of this concept. The following analysis does not evaluate whether homeowners tend to overstate the value of their house at a point in time, but whether during a tumultuous market, owners understand how their house value is changing. The estimated error is a combination of true homeowner error, bias in the HPI due to sample selection or computation of index, and heterogeneity within the owner's CBSA. Unfortunately, I cannot distinguish between these sources.
The median error is close to zero at 2.6%. The 25th and 75th percentile errors are -9%
and 14%, respectively, with significant masses around 8% and -2% ( Figure 6 ). Not updating one's house value, the "non-updates" seen in Figure 5a , could be considered a different kind of mistake-the mean error is 3.5% and the median error is 0.8% when these households are removed. Distinguishing between the two groups within the sample, "stayers" and "movers but not sellers," the latter group has a median error of zero compared with the 2.9% median error of the former.
Boom buyers look similar to the overall population. They are not driving the high frequency of non-updates and are, in fact, less likely to report no change in value. Boom buyers are also less likely to have positive errors, with a median error of -0.9%. Smaller errors and fewer non-updates from boom buyers is not consistent with a denial story. This group of owners should be the most susceptible to denial and loss aversion since they purchased homes at the peak of the market.
As large differences between purchase prices and reported values are seen in Figure 2 for the 2007 SCF, errors calculated as the difference between owner-reported growth between purchase and 2009 and the change in the CBSA HPIs are much larger than those reported here.
For boom buyers, this alternative error measure has a median of 8.2% and a mean of 16.6%.
Confirming the previous discussion of Figure 2 , this divergence occurs between purchase date and 2007. Understanding the gaps between the boom period and the post-boom period is key to rectifying owner valuations with market-based measures and is left for future work.
Variation in homeowner errors by original house value
Are the experiences in the housing market the same for everyone? Or are there certain types of homes or owners who are affected by the market more than others? It is important to know whether the decline in value is felt across the full distribution of home values. Variation within the population has important implications for mobility and for how we interpret the HPIs. There also may be a wedge between owner reports and HPIs in certain segments of the house value distribution if the HPI represents one type of house more than another. Since the HPIs are dollar weighted, it is plausible that they reflect the appreciation of expensive homes more than the appreciation of cheaper homes. Furthermore, if errors vary across households, analyses using housing wealth as a key explanatory variable are affected by non-random errors-in-variables biases. Finally, if certain types of households are making mistakes that could lead to poor decisionmaking, it is important to identify these at-risk households. I ranked households by their There is potential sample selection where house values declined the most. Mobility induced by foreclosures will be likely affected by large declines in house prices. If the non-seller sample used in the analysis contains more desirable homes where households are less affected by a significant drop in home prices, then the owner-reported change in the SCF will be smaller than the true decline in value and the HPIs. Analysis from Figure 5c and Table 1 suggests the impact of this decline is small for the SCF panel. Households who moved because of foreclosure have a similar median HPI change, but a smaller mean. The biggest declines among the foreclosed are larger than the largest declines among the non-foreclosed sample.
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Variation in homeowner errors by housing equity
We might predict that owners who are highly leveraged are more likely to be in denial about the precariousness of their housing position. Recent buyers may be susceptible to loss aversion and not be willing to accept a decline in property value (Genesove and Mayer, 2001 ). This logic may also apply to those at risk of negative equity. However, the presence of loss aversion does not imply owners are unaware of the true value of their home, it merely states they are not willing to sell at a lower price. Those who are underwater on their mortgage may be less likely to sell due to loss aversion-but this doesn't mean they don't know their true property value. Anenberg (Table 2) . As predicted, those with negative equity had 41 Where house prices declined the most, more households are likely to be non-interviews or have moved since the 2007 survey. Not surprisingly, where house prices fell the least, the probability of moving is much lower (12% vs. 3%) and the probability of non-interview is slightly lower (16% vs. 12%). This finding is consistent with Kennickell (2010) . much higher errors than those with positive equity. The relationship observed is highly nonlinear, as those with near-negative equity do not have a higher error than those with more equity.
It is plausible that the impact of housing equity on errors varies by the extent of the local housing crash. On average, those with the least amount of housing equity in 2007 experienced smaller declines in HPI. The caveat is this group was more likely to experience very large declines in house values than those with more equity. Figure 8b suggests those who lived where house values fell a lot had slightly higher errors than those who lived where house values changed little, and Table 2 shows those with negative equity in 2007 have much larger errors in 2009 than those with positive equity. To explore this interaction, I compared those who were highly leveraged in 2007, defined as an LTV above 0.9, with those who were not as highly leveraged and looked at the median error by the extent of the HPI decline (Table 3 ). The findings
here are not what we predicted. The higher leveraged who live where house values fell the most have a strong negative error, whereas those with more equity had a large positive error in these areas. In contrast, the higher leveraged who live in areas with small price declines have larger errors. Maybe it is the case that those who live where prices fell a lot and were higher leveraged felt that the cost of mis-valuing their home was too high and therefore erred on the side of more conservative estimates of house values and overstated how far their house value had fallen.
Those who live where prices fell slightly faced less of a cost in making a mistake, as they had lower probabilities of becoming underwater on their mortgage.
Looking at the interaction between these factors and others that might play a role in the valuation process done by homeowners is an important avenue for future research. The value owners place on their home plays a role in other decisions they make, and understanding which groups are making mistakes is imperative in understanding behavioral choices.
IV. Implications for Loan-to-Value Ratios
The LTV ratio summarizes the extent to which households are leveraged. Those who owe more than their home is worth are considered to be in a precarious financial position. Therefore, many have focused on the number of mortgages underwater since the housing bust. Figure 10a , have negative equity of 11.6%, 44 while those who no longer own their 2007 primary residence report a negative equity rate of 21.2%. 45 The higher rate of negative equity among this latter sample is driven by homes bought between 2007 and
2009
. 46 Those not in the sample, movers and non-interviews, do not have very different median changes in CBSA HPIs than those who don't move (Table 1 ). However, there are different predictions of 2009 LTVs for the movers and non-interviews. The predicted LTVs for the movers are larger than for the non-movers but smaller for the non-interviews than those interviewed. As noted previously, in areas with the largest declines in the HPI, households are more likely to be non-interviews or sell their 2007 primary residence. 42 Other survey data, including the AHS, cannot determine the current LTV since only the original mortgage amount is asked of the respondent. Using reported mortgage terms, a proxy for current mortgage balance is estimated. 43 Glaeser et al (2010) show that the fraction of mortgages with an LTV of 1 at origination did not change much over time between 1998. However, leverage of those with a positive down payment rose over time same time period. 44 CBSA residents have negative equity rate of 11.7% compared to a rate of 10.1% for those who live outside of a CBSA. (Figure 12 ).
V. Conclusions
This study finds that homeowners understand how their primary residence changes in value fairly accurately. It highlights the heterogeneity in these valuations but also the role of sample composition that impacts any comparison of owner reports and transaction values. Biases arising from sample composition seem to be particularly a problem in the run-up of the housing boom and, to a lesser extent, in the period immediately following the housing boom, a period of rapidly declining house values. Generally, owners are good at understanding how the value of their home has changed, at least when compared to their local CBSA HPI. The impact of geography and heterogeneity between locations is of utmost importance when evaluating owners and cannot be ignored. 47 Applying the HPI to purchase value of boom buyers and using the reported mortgage balance in 2009 survey, we see higher levels of negative equity than the owners report. For example, those who bought in 2004 report negative equity of 13.3%, but starting with the purchase price, the CBSA HPIs predict a negative equity rate of 20. values. It may be the case that HPIs may be more useful in measuring the change in value for a set of homes but less useful in measuring the change in the aggregate housing stock. Careful comparison of samples of houses is crucial to understanding the divergence we observe for those who purchased homes in the lead-up to the peak in the housing market. More research here will reveal whether these buyers tend to overstate, or whether they provide accurate valuations like homebuyers before them. The shock to housing values of boom buyers is larger, but they do not have more pronounced errors than other buyers.
One focus for future research that seems quite promising is the role of investors. (Haughwout et al, 2011; Chinco and Mayer, 2012) . Geanakoplos (2009) lays out a theory of the leverage cycle whereby the role of "optimistic buyers" increases during a housing boom and with the loosening of mortgage standards. Haughwout et al (2011) find that investor activity peaked precisely in the few years preceding the peak of the housing market. Furthermore, these owners sold their properties after much shorter intervals, which could impact the estimating of HPIs.
Unfortunately, not all investment properties are captured in the SCF nor is geographical information available for these properties. Although evidence from the 2010 SCF suggests that additional, non-primary residential properties held by households have similar underwater levels as primary residences, the SCF does not have information available on properties held by businesses. Fleming (2011) finds that in 2010, nearly 20% of negative-equity properties were held by investors.
An additional factor worth considering is the timing of home purchases, particularly of first-time homebuyers. Homebuyers could have changed the timing of either entering homeownership or trading up from their starter homes, leading to an increase in these two events during the housing boom. First-time home purchases were much lower following the housing 23 bust (Bhutta, 2012) . Furthermore, this change in timing could have a residual effect on mobility after the housing bust. Both of these factors impact both the SCF and the HPI. Note Overall Gap=13.3%
Overall Gap=35.5%
Gap in recent owner valuations with local HPIs (1990 HPIs ( -2007 Gap in recent owner valuations with local HPIs (1990 HPIs ( -2010 Gap in recent owner valuations with local HPIs (1990 HPIs ( -2004 7.4% 2.0%
8.5% 
Change in House Value
Blue fill is non-movers and black outline is the potential distribution Note: Loan includes all mortgages and home equity loans secured by primary residence. The fraction of homeowners with outstanding mortgage debt that report negative equity is 0.7%.
Source: Author's calculations based on data provided by CoreLogic. 
